88 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
88 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
**Simple and Complex hardware item:**
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_Something is simple if a comprehensive combination of deterministic tests and analyses ensures correct functional performance under all foreseeable operating conditions with no anomalous behavior._
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Everything else is a complex item.
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- Simple hardware item: extensive documentation is unnecessary.
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- Complex items: design assurance should be agreed to by the certification authority.
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- Hierarchically analyse all levels for complexity. Include functions that are not testable such as unused modes or hidden states in sequential machines.
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# System Aspects of Hardware Design Assurance
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1. # System Aspects of Hardware Design Assurance
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2. Allocate System functions to hardware (or software or combination of both)
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3. Assign system development assurance levels
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Overlaps are important: hardware function that contains safety requirements invokes safety assessment process and hardware design life cycle process.
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- 3 Processes work in parallel:
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- System Development Process
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- Hardware Design Life Cycle Process
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- Software Life Cycle Process
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- Design assurance level: [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178C) by impact on passenger safety.
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-
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- ![Level
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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Failure condition
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Catastrophic
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Hazardous
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Major
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Minor
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No Safety Effect
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[11]
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Objectives
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71
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69
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62
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26
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With independence
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30
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18
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5
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2 ](Exported%20image%2020231126172017-1.png)
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- Objective with independance: another person must verify the item.
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Questions
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- [ ] What is our software assurance process
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Todo:
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- [ ] Define functions with associated requirements,
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failure conditions and design assurance level
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Review:
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- [ ] Chap2 |